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IN THE EPILOGUE to his book, The System of Freedom of Ex-
pression, Professor Thomas Emerson poses the question whether
"the system of freedom of expression [can] survive the shift from
the liberal laissez-faire to the mass technological society."' He de-
scribed the modem system as
choked with communications based upon the conventional wis-
dom and... incapable of performing its basic function. Search
for the truth is handicapped because much of the argument is
never heard or heard only weakly. Political decisions are dis-
torted because the views of some citizens never reach other citi-
zens, and feedback to the government is feeble. The possibility of
orderly social change is greatly diminished because those persons
with the most urgent grievances come to believe the system is
unworkable .... 2
Although these words were written with reference to the broader
issue of ailments in the entire system, campaign financing is clearly
an important aspect of this reality. Indeed, because of its close
proximity to political governance, it may be one of the more impor-
tant aspects of the system of freedom of expression Furthermore,
the explosion in campaign costs during the 1970's and 1980's makes
Emerson's description even more apt today than in 1969 when it
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; A.B. (1961); J.D. (1968) University of Califor-
nia at Los Angeles. I am grateful for the outstanding research assistance of Michael O'Neil
and Amy Powers.
1. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 728 (1970).
2. Id. at 628-29.
3. Cf A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
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was written.4
Certainly, neither the framers of the first amendment nor those
of the fourteenth amendment could have foreseen the changes
wrought by the technological revolution upon our political
processes and the concomitant importance of the role of money in
those processes.5 Consequently, one of the crucial constitutional is-
sues of our time is the extent to which .the first amendment will
permit government to regulate campaign financing in an attempt to
deal with this problem. Professor Emerson identifies two general
categories of legislative attempts to "purify" the system: regulation
of "expression that is thought to harm other social interests... [and
regulations] imposed soley to 'promote the goals of the system.' "6
To the latter reforms Emerson would apply a different and presum-
ably more tolerant test of constitutionality. He would ask "whether
there has been an 'abridgment' of freedom of expression," and the
answer would "be framed in terms of accommodation of interests
within the system,... promotion rather than deterrence of expres-
sion."7 While Professor Emerson would tolerate some form of lim-
ited controls, he would not permit extensive legislative tinkering
even though it is rationalized as an attempted improvement of the
system. Imposing extensive controls, Professor Emerson admon-
ishes, will "destroy the system altogether." Even "purification con-
trols . . . can be tolerated in the system only under the most
exceptional circumstances"' he asserts.
4. Total congressional candidate campaign expenditures increased from $194.8 million
in the 1977-1978 campaigns to over $450 million in the 1985-1986 election cycle. Congres-
sional Spending Tops $450 Million in 1986, 13 FED. ELECTION COMM'N 2 (1987).
5. It is estimated that in 1884 each presidential candidate spent between $1.3 million
and $1.4 million during the general campaign. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1081 (1975). In the 1984
presidential campaign, the two party nominees were each given $40.4 million to spend during
the general campaign. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1987, at 245 (1986). The Supreme Court has noted the role of money in
the political process. "[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass soci-
ety requires the expenditure of money." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
6. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 633 (goals of the system include improvement in
"quality and meaningfulness of expression" through the introduction of honesty, decency and
openness).
7. Id. at 629.
8. Id. at 633-34. Professor Emerson explained:
On the basis of these considerations the controlling principles can be stated:
(1) In general, purification controls constitute an "abridgement "of ex-
pression and hence are invalid. They may not be an "abridgement," how-
ever, in exceptional situations in which the regulation in light of its impact
on the whole system, operates to expand rather than contract freedom of
expression.
(2) In applying this rule the burden of proof is on the proponents of the
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Although Professor Emerson applies his principles in some de-
tail to a variety of first amendment issues,9 he expresses little con-
cern that the application of his principles by others to specific
situations might differ from his own applications commenting that
"at least this kind of approach would be based upon the functions
and requirements of the system of freedom of expression."1 Unlike
regulation to establish (a) that the control is clearly necessary to correct a
grave abuse in the operation of the system and is narrowly limited to that
end, and that this objective cannot be achieved by other means, (b) that
the regulation does not limit the content of expression; (c) that the regula-
tion operates equitably and with no undue advantages to any group or
point of view; (d) that the control is in the nature of a regulation, not a
prohibition, and does not substantially impair the area of expression con-
trolled; and (e) that the regulation can be specificially formulated in objec-
tive terms and is reasonably free of the possiblity of administrative abuse.
Id. at 634.
9. Professor Emerson commented specifically on the constitutionality of several "cor-
rupt practices" measures. Id at 639. He indicated that restrictions applicable to persons
other than the candidate should be invalid. Id. This concept is consistent with the distinc-
tion the Court has drawn between limitations applicable to independent expenditures and
those applicable to contributions to candidates. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
The Court has, however, upheld disclosure requirements applicable to those who make such
independent expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75-84 (1976).
With respect to "[m]easures to assure equality of access to the marketplace by candi-
dates," Emerson concluded that they "could be drawn equitably, since each candidate has an
equal interest." T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 639. Therefore, it seems that he might favor
limitations on contributions, of the type that were upheld in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-29, 38,
and limitations on the use of personal wealth by candidates and limitations on the total
amounts spent by candidates in an election. These latter two restrictions were found to be
unconstitutional in Buckley, Id. at 51-54. But the restriction on total funds spent in a cam-
paigu applicable only to candidates accepting public subsidies has been upheld in a summary
affirmance without opinion. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.
Supp. 280, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 445 U.S. 955 (1980). In a more recent article,
Professor Emerson has expressed doubt regarding the constitutionality of making public sub-
sidies depend upon the candidate's agreeing to refuse private contributions. Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 463-64 (1980).
Because of his position that outright bans, rather than regulations, are unconstitutional,
Emerson would have invalidated bans on corporate and union contributions and independent
expenditures in candidate elections. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 639-40. However, it has
become clear that the use of the PAC by corporations and unions has made what was origi-
nally thought of as a ban, into a regulation. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
Although PACs have been used extensively by unions for many years, there was some
doubt about the legality of their use until the mid 1970s. In 1975, the Federal Election Com-
mission issued the Sun Oil Advisory opinion which made it clear that general treasury funds
of unions and corporations could be used to administer and solicit for PACs. Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n Advisory Op. 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56, 584 (1975). From that time on the
growth of corporate PACs has taken on enormous proportions, dwarfing the resources of
union PACs. See eg., Jacobson, Money in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections, in
MONEY AND POLrrIcs IN THE UNITED STATES 42-45 (M. Malbin ed. 1984). Professor Emer-
son has also suggested that corporate bans could be justified if corporations are considered to
be "part of the commercial sector and thus outside the regular system of freedom of expres-
sion." T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 640.
10. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 640.
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more dogmatic and simplistic scholars, Emerson does not offer sac-
rosanct answers; his contribution is much more valuable. Answers
may change depending on the current dynamics of the system, but
the principles Emerson highlights as basic to the system of freedom
of expression will never change; they should continue to serve as
touchstones as long as the first amendment exists.
According to Professor Emerson, the system of freedom of ex-
pression rests on four main premises. These are: the assurance of
individual self-fulfillment; the advancement of knowledge and truth;
the facilitation of the participation of all members of society in deci-
sion making; and the maintenance of a balance between stability
and change.11
Professor Emerson's steady eye on the basic principles of the
system of freedom of expression, and his careful application of these
principles to legislative attempts to "purify" the system contrast
starkly with the approach of the Supreme Court in campaign fi-
nance regulation cases. Starting in 1976 with the seminal case
Buckley v. Valeo,"2 in which the constitutionality of the post Water-
gate reforms was considered, the Court has veered wildly between
extreme d~ference to Congress and extreme interventionism, some-
times in the same case. 13 Broad pronouncements of supposed prin-
ciples have been articulated, only to be ignored in favor of equally
broad pronouncements of inconsistent principles in the next case.
14
Although a careful analysis of the precise effects of the various
statutes on the system of freedom of expression could have justified
the results in most of the cases, the Court has instead created such a
doctrinal tangle for itself that it cannot deal with any campaign fi-
nance issue without implicitly rejecting important dicta and some-
times even the actual holdings of previous cases.1 5 The doctrinal
inconsistencies have led commentators to suspect that political
compromise, rather than first amendment principles, is playing a
dominant role. Indeed Buckley has been described as "a King Solo-
11. Id. at 6-7.
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13. In Buckley the Court seemed to apply strict scrutiny to some aspects of the statute
and almost no scrutiny at all to other aspects. See Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Consti-
tutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
323.
14. See infra notes 49-74 and accompanying text. Compare Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) with Federal Election Comm'n v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). See generally Nicholson,
The Supreme Court's Meandering Path in Campaign Finance Regulation and What it
Portends for Future Reform, 3 J.L. & POL. 509 (1987).
15. See infra notes 46-74 and accompanying text.
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mon's policy compromise." 16
Given this history, the most recent campaign finance case de-
cided by the Supreme Court, Federal Election Commission v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,17 was a pleasant surprise. Certainly
the opinion can be faulted as inconsistent with some other cases, 18
but the mixed signals in previous cases made that inevitable. Justice
Brennan's analysis for the majority makes much more sense from
the standpoint of protection of the principles which are basic to the
system of freedom of expression than the analyses found in earlier
campaign finance cases.
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court invalidated long
standing federal bans on corporate independent spending in federal
elections as applied to ideological organizations. 9 The case itself
will probably have little effect on the political system, because, as
the Court explained, the "class of organizations affected by our
holding today [may] be small."2 ° It is nevertheless a case of major
importance because in strong dicta it apparently settles the question
of the constitutionality of a major provision of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act that has been considered of doubtful constitutionality
for a number of years.21 Furthermore, it gives valuable clues to
legislatures attempting to draft future reforms that will survive con-
stitutional challenges. The primary caveat must be that it was a five
to four decision,22 and that one member of the majority is no longer
on the Court.23
II. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. MASSACHUSETTS
CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INa
The stated purpose of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
16. Fleishman & MeCorkle, Level-up Rather Than Level Down: Toward a New Theory
of Campaign Finance Reform, I J.L. & POL. 211, 222 (1984).
17. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
18. See infra notes 47-89 and accompanying text.
19. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
20. 107 S. Ct. at 631. Also, depending on how other statutory provisions are inter-
preted, ideological corporations may find it more desirable to form a PAC to make independ-
ent expenditures even though they cannot be required to do so. See Oldaker, Ideological
Expenditures, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, March-April, 1987, at 57-58.
21. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Part of the decision was agreed to by only a plurality. See infra, notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
23. Justice Powell was a member of the majority. However, because the dissent was
willing to go even further than the majority in upholding campaign finance reform, a change
in the makeup of the Court should not be a threat to most reform measures. 107 S. Ct. at
632-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
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(MCFL), a nonprofit, nonstock, Massachusetts corporation, was
purely ideological.24 The corporation spent $9,800 from its general
treasury funds to publish and circulate a "Special Election Edition"
of its regular newsletter. This edition contained the voting records
of incumbent legislators on abortion related issues, answers to ques-
tionnaires sent by MCFL to non-incumbents, and the pictures of
"pro life" candidates.25 The statute in question prohibited the use of
corporate general treasury funds for expenditures made "for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 6 The dis-
trict court interpreted the statute narrowly and thus concluded that
the alleged conduct did not satisfy the statutory definition of "ex-
penditure,"27 and that, in any event, MCFL's action came within an
exemption for news commentary.28 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed with the district
court's conclusion that the statute was not applicable to MCFL's
actions,29 but all three courts agreed that, as applied to MCFL, the
24. MCFL's articles of incorporation provided that it was formed to:
foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born
and unborn, through educational, political and other forms of activities and in addi-
tion to engage in any other lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized....
107 S. Ct. at 619 (quoting from MCFL articles of incorporation, app. 84). The Court stressed
that MCFL did not accept contributions from unions or corporations. Id. at 619.
25. 107 S. Ct. at 619.
26. Id. at 621. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (1982).
27. 589 F. Supp. 646, 649 (D. Mass. 1984).
28. Id. at 650. The exemption applied to "any news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 621-24; 769 F.2d 13, 21-22 (1985). The Supreme Court with respect to
the news commentary exemption, commented:
[W]e need not decide whether the regular MCFL newsletter is exempt under this
provision, because, even assuming that it is, the "Special Edition" cannot be consid-
ered comparable to any single issue of the newsletter. It was not published through
the facilities of the regular newsletter, but by a staff which prepared no previous or
subsequent newsletter. It was not distributed to the newsletter's regular audience,
but to a group twenty times the size of that audience, most of whom were members
of the public who had never received the newsletter. No characteristic of the Edi-
tion associated it in any way with the normal MCFL publication.
107 S. Ct. at 624. The issue of whether the conduct came within the definition of "expendi-
ture" under the act arose because there were two definitions of the word in the statute. One
definition appeared to require that a thing of value be given to the candidate. Id. at 621; 2
U.S.C. § 441b. The other definition required only that the transfer of a thing of value be
"made 'for the purpose of influencing any election for federal office.'" 107 S. Ct. at 621
(quoting in part from 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i)). The Court resolved the conflict by looking to
the legislative history which indicated that the latter broader definition was intended. Id. at
621-23.
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statute would be unconstitutional.3"
It was clear from the inception of the controversy, which
culminated in the litigation, that there were three basic facts which
would be pivotal in determining the constitutionality of the statute
as applied. First, the action at issue was an expenditure made by
MCFL on behalf of certain candidates, not a contribution to those
candidates. Second, MCFL was a corporation, not an individual or
even an unincorporated association. Third, MCFL was not a busi-
ness corporation, rather it was a corporation formed purely for ide-
ological expression. The first and third elements pointed 'in the
direction of finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to
MCFL. Only the second offered the government hope for a finding
of constitutionality.
Predictably, the Court began its constitutional analysis by
stressing that the political expression of MCFL was in the form of
an independent expenditure. 31 The government argued that the ban
actually involved minimal burdens on independent expression be-
cause a corporation could form a political action committee (PAC)
with a separate segregated fund which could be used for unlimited
independent expression on behalf of federal candidates.32 Further-
more, unlimited corporate funds could be used for administration
of, and solicitation for, such a fund. 33
A majority of the Court responded that the requirement of a
formalized organization might deter ideological groups from engag-
ing in political expression 34 and that statutory limitations on PAC
solicitation could result in much less money being available for in-
dependent expenditures than if general treasury funds could be
used. 35 Justice O'Connor, concurring in part, rejected the addi-
tional argument adopted by the other four justices in the majority,
that the reporting requirements applicable to PACs were too heavy
30. 107 S. Ct. at 624-31; 769 F.2d at 23 (1985); 589 F. Supp. at 649.
31. 107 S. Ct. at 624.
32. Id. at 624-25.
33. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982).
34. 107 S. Ct. at 626; id. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
35. Id. In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
206 (1982), the Court had upheld very stringent limitations on who could be solicited by
corporate PACs for contributions to the PACs' separate segregated funds. Ideological corpo-
rations without stockholders or members would only be permitted to solicit their employees.
The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, stressed the broad deference given
Congress in regulating the political expression of corporations. Id. at 209-10.
It should be noted that this case also involved an ideological corporation, yet the opinion,
which was couched in broad generalities, gave little attention to this fact.
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a burden on MCFL.3 6 She apparently was concerned that the plu-
rality's focus on that factor could cast doubt on the holding in
Buckley that disclosure requirements are constitutional.37 The ma-
jority concluded that "while [the statute] does not remove all op-
portunities for independent spending by organizations such as
MCFL, the avenue it leaves open is more burdensome than the one
it forecloses."38
The Court cited Buckley for the proposition that independent
expenditures are "' "at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms." '",39 Therefore, the majority con-
cluded that the restriction could only be sustained upon a finding
that it was justified by a compelling state interest.4' The Court
could have resolved the case very quickly at this point by reiterating
statements in earlier cases that preventing corruption is the only
interest compelling enough to sustain such restrictionsa t and that
independent expenditures, unlike contributions, do not cause signifi-
cant corruption.42 Instead, the Court chose to formulate a novel
definition of corruption and wrote an opinion that says as much
about why the political expression of business corporations may be
regulated as it says about why the expression of MCFL may not.
Looking at the purported compelling interests behind the stat-
ute, the Court explained why these interests are important in the
context of business corporations and how irrelevant they are to ide-
ological corporations like MCFL. According to the Court, there
36. 107 S. Ct. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (the burden to MCFL came
from the requirement that it assume a more formalized organizational form and not from the
disclosure requirements placed on it). More limited, and thus less burdensome, reporting
requirements were applicable to the independent expenditures of non-PAC organizations. Id.
37. Id. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
38. Id. at 626.
39. Id. at 624 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976), quoting Williams v.
Rhodes 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
40. 107 S. Ct. at 624.
41. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1982);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
26 (1976).
42. In Buckley, the Court upheld limitations on contributions but invalidated limitations
on independent expenditures made without coordination with the campaign. According to
the majority, "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate." 424 U.S. at 47. See also Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (exchange of official favors
hypothetically possible but unlikely without cooperation or prearrangement). For a critique
of this position see Nicholson, supra note 13, at 340-42.
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were two justifications behind the statute. The7 first was to protect
the marketplace of political ideas from the "corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth."43 The second was to prevent "an
organization from using an individual's money for purposes that the
individual may not support."'
A. "The Corrosive Influence of Concentrated
Corporate Wealth" 45
Concern over the political power of concentrated corporate
wealth has been articulated in other cases involving restrictions on
corporate and union political expression.46 Even so, there was a
great deal of confusion regarding the breadth of the interest, in part
due to statements in a number of cases that purported to interpret
legitimate rationales for campaign finance restrictions very
narrowly. 47
A broad interpretation of the corrosive effect of concentrated
wealth might justify measures to equalize the political influence of
voters. Arguably, whether sizeable political contributions come
from an organization or a wealthy individual, the use of concen-
trated wealth in the electoral process is unfair because it gives some
a special advantage in influencing the outcome of elections. Afflu-
ent voters can back up their votes with substantial contributions
that are used to persuade other voters. Dr. David Adamany calls
this the "multiple vote" effect.48 Furthermore, the need for huge
sums of money to compete with well financed candidates deters
those without ties to wealthy interests from even entering the polit-
ical fray. Concentrated wealth thus not only makes the electoral
43. 107 S. Ct. at 627.
44. Id. at 629.
45. Id. at 627.
46. The Court cited several such cases. Id. at 627-29. For instance, in Pipefitters Local
Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972), the Court interpreted the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, then 18 U.S.C. § 610, to permit the use of a separate, segregated fund
for political expenditures and contributions. Explaining the purpose of the statute, the Court
stated that it was meant to "eliminate the 'effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections.'"
107 S. Ct. at 627 (quoting Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 416).
47. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
48. D. ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS 236 (1969). According to Adamany, "by allo-
cating some of their resources to politics [contributors] have weight beyond their votes in
deciding elections." Id. See discussion in Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protec-
tion, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (1974). The appellate court in Buckley adopted a similar
rationale in upholding all the limitations in the statute. 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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system less democratic, it also reduces variety in the marketplace of
political ideas.
In Buckley, the Court seemingly rejected the interest in equaliz-
ing the political power of the non-affluent as a basis for upholding
limitations on independent expenditures, commenting:
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... The First
Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement of
free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's
financial ability to engage in public discussion.4 9
In the next important campaign finance case, First National Bank v.
Bellotti, 0 the Court again rejected the equalization rationale. The
majority chastised the Massachusetts legislature for its paternalism
in trying to shield voters from the influence of corporate wealth by
enacting a statute banning corporations from expending funds in
connection with ballot measure campaigns.51
With this background, it appeared that the equalization ration-
ale was dead as a basis for limiting political funding. The only ra-
tionale sufficient to sustain such restrictions was the prevention of
the reality and appearance of "corruption" and "improper influ-
ence," concerns the Court had found sufficient to uphold limitations
on contributions in Buckley.2 But what did the Court mean by
these terms? Certainly the "influence" to which the Court referred
was influence on office holders, not on other voters or electoral out-
comes. This was implicit in the Court's rejection of the equalization
rationale and was made explicit in 1981 when the Court in Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley53 explained Buckley as
identifying only the prevention of the appearance or the reality of
undue influence on office holders as a sufficient rationale for cam-
49. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
50. 435 U.S. 765, 790-91, reh'g denied 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
51. The Bellotti majority commented that
[to be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would
be its purpose. .. . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments....
But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced ... it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 790-92 (footnote omitted). See also the rejection of the equalization rationale in Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981).
52. 424 U.S. at 25-29.
53. 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (limitations on contributions in ballot measure elections
unconstitutional).
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paign funding restrictions. 4
Arguably, any additional weight given by office holders to the
interests of contributors over the interests of others is "improper."
This concept might even include access to the office holder, a com-
modity almost all politicians admit is for sale." At the very least it
should include situations ii which the office holder changes his or
her position in order to attract a contribution, or out of a sense of
obligation caused by a past contribution. Indeed, the Court im-
pliedly rejected the position that only actual bribes should be con-
sidered corruption. Upholding limitations on contributions in
Buckley, the Court stated that "laws making criminal the giving
and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action."56
Nevertheless, in 1985, the Court indicated that its concept of
corruption was a very narrow one, apparently limited to a pre-ar-
ranged bribe. In Federal Election Committee v. National Conserva-
tive Political Action Committee,57 the Court announced:
[c]orruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected offi-
cials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the
financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.58
Less than two years later in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the
Court not only expanded its definition of corruption, beyond that
articulated in National Conservative Political Action Committee, but
in doing so it seemed to adopt a version of the much maligned
equalization rationale as part of its new definition. In Massachusetts
Citizens for Life the "corrosive effect of concentrated wealth" to
which the Court referred is the effect on the electoral process, not
the effect on office holders. The Court explained that "[d]irect cor-
porate spending on political activity raises the prospect that re-
sources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace," and that
"these resources may make a corporation a formidable political
presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no re-
flection of the power of its ideas." 19 One might ask what happened
54. Id. at 297.
55. See H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 181-86 (1972).
56. 424 U.S. at 27-28.
57. 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating limitations on independent expenditures by polit-
ical committees on behalf of presidential candidates accepting public subsidies).
58. Id. at 497.
59. 107 S. Ct. at 628.
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to Bellotti's strong anti-paternalism dicta.6" The Court curtly dis-
tinguished Bellotti in a footnote as involving a complete ban on cor-
porate expenditures rather than a limitation.6 Perhaps a little bit
of paternalism is appropriate after all.
This sudden concern over the effect of unequal wealth in the
political process is puzzling, but the Court's concept of equality in
the electoral context was a qualified one. Inequality of funds was
appropriate as long as it represented a "rough barometer of public
support."6 2 However, the funds available to a business corporation
have nothing to do with support for political ideas. Rather they
"reflect ... the economically motivated decisions of investors and
customers."
63
The Court's approach in Massachusetts Citizens for Life offered
an excellent method of both supporting the application of the stat-
ute to business corporations and finding the statute unconstitutional
as applied to MCFL. The Court explained that MCFL and other
ideological corporations do not obtain their resources in the eco-
nomic marketplace. Rather, their resources are a function of their
political popularity. Thus, "[g]roups such as MCFL . . . do not
pose that danger of corruption."6
B. "Preventfing] an Organization From Using an Individual's
Money for Purposes that the Individual
May Not Support"65
This rationale had been referred to in several earlier union
cases,6 6 but until Federal Election Commission v. National Right to
60. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. 107 S. Ct. at 628 n.12.
62. Id. at 628. This approach was also referred to briefly in Buckley when the Court
invalidated limitations on total campaign spending. The Court stated that
[g]iven the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources
available to a candidate's campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will
normally vary with the size and intensity of the candidate's support. There is noth-
ing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry
the candidate's message to the electorate.
424 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted). Professor Daniel Lowenstein has posited two standards of
fairness in electoral campaigns - the equality standard and the intensity standard. Lowen-
stein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory
and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 514-17 (1982).
63. 107 S. Ct. at 628.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 629.
66. See, e.g. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414 (1972);
United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
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Work Committee67 it had never been explicitly relied upon as a ba-
sis for a finding of constitutionality of corporate or union funding
restrictions. Indeed, the Court had scoffed at the concern for dis-
senting shareholders in dicta in Bellotti.6
8
In National Right to Work, the Court upheld very stringent re-
strictions on who could be solicited by the PACs of some ideologi-
cal corporations. 69  Because all money obtained by the National
Right to Work Committee (NRWC) and its PAC came from per-
sons who shared the ideological views of the organization, it is diffi-
cult to see how minority interests were a factor in that case. Indeed
the reference to those interests in the opinion looks like dicta. In
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, however, the Court stated that mi-
nority protection had been held to justify the solicitation restric-
tions in National Right to Work.7" This interpretation created a
problem for the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, because
the ideological organizations in the two cases were so similar. The
Court rather abruptly resolved the contradiction by asserting that
"the government enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions
than in regulating independent expenditures."'"
Using arguments nearly identical to those made in Justice
White's dissent in Bellotti,72 Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life explained why the interest in pro-
tecting minority shareholders was important.
[B]ecause such individuals depend on the organization for in-
come or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhappi-
ness with the use of their money can be redressed simply by
leaving the corporation or the union. It was thus wholly reason-
able for Congress to require the establishment of a separate polit-
67. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
68. Appellee does not explain why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled
to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others where equally impor-
tant and controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a prede-
termined percentage of the shareholders....
The critical distinction here is that no shareholder has been 'compelled' to con-
tribute anything .... the shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition
and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason. ...
435 U.S. at 794 n.34.
69. The statute permitted the PACs of nonstock corporations to solicit only members
and employees, but the Court found it unnecessary to adopt a broad definition of "members,"
thus limiting the ideological PAC in that case to solicitation of its employees. The narrow
definition asserted by the government was found to be constitutional. 459 U.S. at 211.
70. 107 S. Ct. at 630.
71. Id. at 630.
72. 435 U.S. at 812-20 (White, J., dissenting).
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ical fund to which persons can make voluntary contributions.73
Again the Court was able to use the government interest to support
the application of the statute to business corporations while show-
ing its irrelevance to MCFL. The Court concluded that because the
contributors are aware of the political activity of MCFL, and can
merely refuse further contributions if they object to the expression,
there was insufficient reason to require organizations like MCFL to
form PACs for independent expression.74
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE
Massachusetts Citizens for Life is a significant step toward clear-
ing the confusion created by the Court in the previous 14 years of
campaign finance litigation. The narrow holding in the case-that
an ideological corporation making independent expenditures cannot
be required to act through a PAC 7"-is clearly correct, but will
have a minimal effect on the system of freedom of expression.76
More important than the holding is the strong dicta indicating that
the application of the PAC requirement to business corporations is
constitutional.
The case has even greater ramifications, however. It is quite
clear that the PAC requirement has not been a serious impediment
to extensive involvement by business corporations and unions in the
political process.7 7 Massachusetts Citizens for Life presents the pos-
sibility that more meaningful regulation of these entities would be
constitutional.
Despite the present statutory requirement that PAC contribu-
tions must be voluntary,78 the statutory scheme is inadequate to
achieve that goal. Corporate PACs are permitted unlimited solici-
tation of executive and administrative staff. Anonymity is required
only when solicitations include nonexecutive or nonadministrative
73. 107 S. Ct. at 629.
74. Id. at 630.
75. The Court was very explicit regarding the scope of the holding. Aside from being a
purely ideological corporation, the Court also stressed that MCFL had "no shareholders or
other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings ... [that it] was not
established by a business corporation or labor union, and [that its] policy was not to accept
contributions from such [sources]." 107 S. Ct. at 631.
76. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
77. Total corporate PAC contributions to congressional candidates, for example, have
risen from $9.5 million in 1977-1978 to $45.9 million in 1985-1986. Fed. Election Comm'n,
Press Release (May 21, 1987).
78. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1982).
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,employees, and then only when the contributions are under $50.79
Certainly protection of rank and file employees is important, but the
more visible and affluent administrative and executive staff are even
more likely to feel career pressures to contribute. 80 Thus, fre-
quently these funds in fact represent the use of employees' money
for purposes they may not support. Indeed this problem also impli-
cates the other interest articulated in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life. Coerced contributions from employees are certainly not rough
barometers of political support. Rather, they represent the eco-
nomic power of the corporation over the lives of its employees, ar-
guably another "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate
wealth." Massachusetts Citizens for Life lends constitutional sup-
port to reform measures which would go further in assuring the
voluntariness of employee contributions to PACs. Anonymity,
should be required for all employee PAC contributions regardless of
the amount or the position held by the contributor.
Even though stockholders usually would not feel coerced to
contribute to a PAC, the statute permits treasury funds to be used
to administer and solicit for the PAC."' Thus stockholders' assets
supply the crucial seed money for PACs whose political expression
they may abhor. Proposals to give stockholders more protection
have been suggested by commentators82 and should be found consti-
tutional on the authority of Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
Another legislative approach would be to permit independent
expenditures from business corporation or union treasury funds, but
place limitations on their amounts. However, if Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life is read narrowly, the Court may conclude that requir-
ing expenditures through PACs is a less restrictive alternative to
protect the interests articulated in that case. If PAC funds are truly
voluntary, this might be an adequate answer. However, it could be
argued that union and business corporation PACs can never
achieve the kind of ideological cohesion between contributors and
those who spend the funds that exists with issue oriented corpora-
79. Rank and file employees cannot be solicited more than twice per year. The solicita-
tion must be in writing. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B).
80. See Goldberg, Shakedown in the Board Room, THE WASH. MONTHLY 14-19 (Dec.
1983).
81. 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
82. Brudney, Business Corporations and Shareholder's Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.. 235 (1981); Nicholson, The Supreme Court's Meandering Path in Cam-
paign Finance Regulation and What it Portends for Future Reform, 3 J.L. & POL. 509, 553-54
(1987).
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tions such as MCFL. 83
Although Massachusetts Citizens for Life made no reference to
ballot measure elections, the rationales asserted have particular sig-
nificance in those elections because corporations have played a
large, and some believe, determinative role in many instances.84 In-
deed, there is much stronger evidence of domination by corpora-
tions in ballot measure elections than in candidate elections. 5
Given the ability of corporations to raise very large sums through
PACs, it seems unlikely that a PAC requirement would solve the
problem.
Because voters may be suspicious of billboards opposing anti-
smoking ordinances which are identified as paid for by Philip Mor-
ris, corporations prefer to donate huge sums to committees with
innocuous "good-government-sounding" names. Thus, the most ef-
fective reform would be limitations on contributions. Certainly
such an approach is paternalistic; it assumes voters may be confused
and misled by slick, expensive advertising and that they will not
make the effort to find information on the poorly funded side of the
controversy. Unfortunately, this seems a rather accurate descrip-
tion of reality.86 Despite the anti-paternalism language in Bellotti,87
the emphasis in Massachusetts Citizens for Life on preventing the
effect of concentrated wealth in the electoral process lends constitu-
tional support to statutory limitations on contributions from busi-
ness corporations in ballot measure elections.
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley,88 however, the
83. One solution would be a requirement of far more involvement by contributors to
business, corporation and union PACs in decisions regarding the expenditure of funds. See
Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation of Independent Political Commit-
tees, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1983). Such a requirement would probably make PACs much
less desirable to corporate management. See Comment, Corporate Political Action Commit-
tees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 26 CATH. U.L. REV.
756, 773 (1977).
84. See S. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN FINANC-
ING STATE BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS 7-9 (Council on Economic Priorities 1979); J.
SHOCKLEY, THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN COLORADO POLITICS: AN ASSESSMENT 8-11 (Bu-
reau of Governmental Research & Service, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1980); Lowen-
stein, supra note 62; Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of
the Referendum Process through Media Spending and What To Do About It, 32 FED. COM.
L.J. 315, 320-23 (1980); Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts.-
Can Corruption, Undue Influence and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 3 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 377 (1985).
85. D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 14748 (1984).
86. See Lowenstein, supra note 62, at 517-67.
87. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-92 (1977).
88. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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Court invalidated limitations on contributions applicable to individ-
uals, corporations, and other organizations in ballot measure elec-
tions. The Court stressed that the only legitimate rationale was
preventing improper influence on office holders and rejected the
concept of improper influence on the election itself. Perhaps Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life requires that Berkeley be overruled. Also,
Massachusetts Citizens for Life could be read to justify limitations
on independent expenditures by individuals and the use of personal
wealth by candidates, providing authority for future cases which
would overrule parts of Buckley.89 These issues raise the question
whether the effect upon the election of the concentrated wealth of
individuals is encompassed by the newly formulated corruption ra-
tionale of Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
The Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, by stressing the
concern over corporate wealth, implied that its analysis was not ap-
plicable to individuals. But the Court did not give an adequate rea-
son for distinguishing these sources from individual wealth. It is
not a satisfactory answer to assert that "the availability of ... re-
sources may make a corporation a formidable political presence,
even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of
the power of its ideas." 90 One could say the same of an expenditure
by a very wealthy individual. The power of an individual's expres-
sion may depend on how large an inheritance was received from a
parent, or luck in the stock market. Even if the wealth is earned
through hard work, what does that have to do with the power of
ideas? Furthermore, many business corporations do not have ex-
tensive resources available for political expression. The fact that it
is more likely that a corporation would have greater resources than
even a very wealthy individual should not be determinative; the
PAC requirement can be seen as both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive.9t There seems to be a piece missing in the Court's newly for-
mulated corruption theory.
89. -Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-54 (1976) (The Court stated: "It is clear that a
primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech
by individuals, groups and candidates. These restictions, while neutral as to ideas expressed,
limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms.'" With respect to limits on the spending of personal or family resources, the
Court concluded: "the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon
the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy.
We therefore hold that § 608(a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is
unconstitutional.").
90. 107 S. Ct. 616, 628.
91. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-95.
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The most convincing way of finding that piece takes us back to
Professor Emerson's first principle: self-realization. Corporate ex-
pression does not reflect the self-realization of actual people. 92 Per-
haps we must be willing to tolerate the possibility of a coercive
influence of concentrated wealth when it represents someone's self-
fulfillment, but we need not do so when that element is missing.
Certainly this is a principled conclusion. It is one, however, that
this author would reject. The self-realization interest should be
considered in conjunction with Professor Emerson's other three in-
terests: the search for truth, involvement by all in the political pro-
cess, and facilitation of orderly social change.93 All four interests
could be accommodated if very generous limitations were applied to
independent expenditures, the use of candidate wealth and contri-
butions in ballot measure elections. 94
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there is room for debate as to how far the Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life rationale can legitimately be taken, it is clear
that all four of Professor Emerson's basic principles lend support to
the distinction made by the Court between business and ideological
corporations. Although some commentators may take the position
that any restriction which affects the quantity of expression inter-
feres with the search for truth, I do not read Professor Emerson's
approach to purification of the system as that absolute. He has
noted that when the system is "choked with communication" it
may be "incapable of performing its basic function." 95 If the con-
cern is with variety of ideas rather than the absolute quantity of
words, it makes greater sense to place limitations on business corpo-
rations, but not ideological groups. There seems to be little danger
that the interests of business corporations will be neglected and that
their views will be excluded from the marketplace of ideas. Those
who control business corporations usually have access to personal
wealth that can be used for expression, and they are ordinarily not
92. It probably reflects only someone's determination of what will be most profitable for
the corporation, which may or may not correspond with anyone's view of good political
policy.
93. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 6-7.
94. Arguably, the $1,000 limitations on independent expenditures invalidated in Buck-
ley and National Conservative Political Action Comm. and the $250 limitations on contribu-
tions in ballot measure campaigns invalidated in Berkeley were unnecessarily low. Although
the broad language in the cases would be an obstacle, see, e.g., supra notes 47-58 and accom-
panying text, more generous limitations could be distinguished by the Court in a future case.
95. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 628-29.
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lacking in access to and close relationships with the political leaders
of the country. Variety comes not from amplifying their voices fur-
ther, but from facilitating the expression of the less affluent and less
powerful.
These same considerations make Massachusetts Citizens for Life
consistent with Professor Emerson's other two principles: partici-
pation in the political process by all members of the society and the
facilitation of orderly social change.96 With respect to the latter
interest, Professor Emerson comments that
[t]he function of freedom of expression in promoting orderly so-
cial change has not been stressed in recent literature. Yet it
surely remains at the heart of the system. The need for a system
that will facilitate social change-change that will necessarily in-
volve significant deprivations for some members of society and
gains for others-has never been more pressing. 97
Certainly orderly social change can only be facilitated when polit-
ical dialogue is no longer dominated by the wealthy and the power-
ful: those who have the greatest stake in the status quo.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life is a small step in the direction of
facilitating the basic principles of "the system of freedom of expres-
sion." Future interpretations of the case offer the promise of fur-
ther steps.
96. T. EMERSON, supra note I, at 6-7.
97. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422,
428 (1980).
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